Despite telling us almost from the start that Chrysler was in
the catbird seat under Cerberus ownership, now word comes that
CEO Bob Nardelli is telling the troops out in Auburn Hills that
things are worse than expected. How could they not be? The
combination of a devalued dollar, declining refinery capacity
(China is not only hoarding diesel fuel, it is reportedly keeping
its refineries off line until after the Olympics to help with the
country’s disastrous air quality), a Federal Reserve that isn’t
sure day-to-day whether is should raise or lower interest rates,
soaring gas prices, and the hot air that comes from a major
election has temporarily conspired to take the wind out of the
economy’s sales.
What I want to know, however, is how an industry that just
over 10 years ago was bragging it could make money in a down year
– 12-million to 14-million annual sales – due to its new-found
lean strategies could throw it all away so quickly. Between 1990
and 2000, the population of the United
States increased 13.2%. With
live births averaging 4-million per year – or 32-million over the
past eight years – that means the current population, estimated
by the Census Bureau at more than 304-million, should be
approximately 280.8-million people. Or, to put it another way,
there are 24-million people in the United
States who were not born here
and can be assumed to be somewhat older than the children born
here over the past eight years. (The oldest of those would turn
eight this year, about a decade short of when they would begin to
consider new car ownership.)
If we assume an average sales year of 15-million units prior
to this decade, the recent 17-million plateau represents a nearly
12% growth in sales. It is safe to assume that 12% of the
immigrants are of car-buying age. Thus this 2.9-million would
neatly account for the increase in sales. However, the increase
in vehicle sales did not increase in a step fashion, but rose
dramatically on good economic news, tax cuts, and stable gasoline
prices. This suggests that many of the new vehicle purchases were
discretionary, and would not have taken place had conditions not
been so favorable. Let’s not forget that Detroit, as
well as a number of the import makers, had incentives on their
vehicles during this period that had the effect of lowering not
only the transaction price, but the monthly payment as well. In
addition, the "9/11 effect," wherein incentives were increased to
"Keep America Rolling," created a distortion that has carried
forward as buyers bargain hunted and OEMs did everything they
could from a small bag of tricks to keep the sales momentum up.
The combination of these economic incentives pulled forward
purchases (i.e., caused buyers to trade their current vehicle in
sooner), encouraged buyers at the upper levels of the used car
market to make a new vehicle purchase, and increased the number
of new owners (e.g., adding a vehicle for high school-age
children) and discretionary buyers. Though not a classical
"bubble," the increase moved like a wave through the market
carrying the day of reckoning forward with it.
The effect is magnified by a media that trumpets a recession
that still has not arrived. (We have not seen two quarters of GDP
decline as of yet, though it would be safe to say there are areas
of the country in trouble.) This causes even those whose
situation has not been altered to reconsider new purchases,
especially those of big-ticket items like cars and trucks. In the
short term, this perception will not only cause great pain to
companies like Chrysler that were weakened to begin with, it will
also drive the wave mentioned earlier out of the system and
return annual sales back to a more normal level while also
establishing a revised sales floor much more quickly and
painfully.
In the short run Chrysler, like the rest of the Big Three,
suffers from a product portfolio overly reliant on trucks and is
paying for its inattentiveness to the car market. Chrysler also
has the added burden of former owners so arrogant that they
believed they could cruise to victory in the bread-and-butter
portion of the North American market with underperforming
product, and nearly destroyed the company in the process.
Welcome to the auto industry, Mr. Nardelli. Next time you and
the ex-GE brain trust at Cerberus might want to expand your
definition of "diligence."